The FDA Knows Best . . Or Does It? First Amendment Protection Of Health Claims On Dietary Supplements: \u3cem\u3ePearson v. Shalala\u3c/em\u3e by Spencer, Amber K.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 5
5-1-2000
The FDA Knows Best . . Or Does It? First
Amendment Protection Of Health Claims On
Dietary Supplements: Pearson v. Shalala
Amber K. Spencer
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law
and Policy Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amber K. Spencer, The FDA Knows Best . . Or Does It? First Amendment Protection Of Health Claims On Dietary Supplements: Pearson v.
Shalala, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 87 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol15/iss1/5
The FDA Knows Best. .. Or Does It? First Amendment 
Protection of Health Claims on Dietary Supplements: 
Pearson v. Shalala * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of the First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech recognized the American devotion 
to the concept of the free flow of ideas. 1 As these cases articulate, the 
democratic ideal rests on the belief that the people are sovereign in their 
ability to sift through the varying expressions of their fellow citizens-
whatever the motivation of the speaker-in order to glean true 
information from among the deceptive chaff of blatantly false or merely 
misleading communication. Many scholars note, however, that the 
Founders seem to have adopted the Bill of Rights as a quick expediency 
in order to convince the states to adopt the Constitution, which was 
viewed as a harbinger of the immense power to be exercised by the 
federal government, and, as a consequence, did not clearly consider the 
meaning and nature of "speech" and other rights protected therein.2 
As a result of this lack of thoughtful intent, the definitional 
development of these rights has been, by necessity, created through the 
constitutional determinations of the Supreme Court. Jurisprudence in the 
First Amendment freedom of speech analysis has been particularly 
dynamic, as the courts have had to decide how to regulate the increasing 
avenues of communications provided to the average U.S. citizen in the 
information age. In recent decades, the Court has attempted to define 
"speech" more concretely, or more expansively, and has created 
classifications of speech that are accorded varying levels of First 
Amendment protection based on the social value of the speech? 
As the Supreme Court has developed this hierarchy of speech 
protection under the First Amendment, regulation has become 
* Copyright © 2000 by Amber K. Spencer. 
I. See Phillip J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's Free 
Flow Theory of the first Amendement, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1992). See 
also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
2. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some Fundamental First Amendment Problems, 
47 MD. L.J. 1,22 (1971). 
3. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
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increasingly complex, intruding in the ordinary affairs of U.S. domestic 
life. The 'awe of the expert,' characteristic of the New Deal era, created a 
system of administrative agencies interested in protecting the public from 
the dangers of modern society, including dangers to public health and 
safety. Ultimately, some argue that the administrative state has taken this 
duty of protection to the extreme of protecting the individual citizen even 
from himself or herself. Critics of the administrative state note that the 
elevation of the 'expert' leads to the degradation of democracy and 
diminishes the individual's ability to act in his or her own best interests 
by making informed choices.4 These critics note that the goal of 
regulatory agencies ought to first be to "ensure genuinely informed 
choices, 'rather than to dictate outcome from Washington"' and that the 
administrative state should establish a priority to be more dedicated to 
"educative, rather than regulatory" functions. 5 
The FDA's regulation of health claims on labels of dietary 
supplements sits at the intersection of these two areas of debate-the 
evolution of First Amendment speech protection and the effects of the 
administrative state on democracy. The Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act (OSHEA) does not require dietary manufacturers to prove 
the safety of the product before it reaches the shelf. Supplements are 
placed in the same category as foods under the FDA regulatory scheme; 
however, the health claim labeling requirements of the Dietary Labeling 
and Education Act applying to dietary supplements were not repealed 
with the OSHEA, and strict limitations on labeling remain in place. 
Section II of this note focuses on the relevant history of the FDA 
regulation of health claims on the labels of dietary supplements, as well 
as the evolution of the commercial free speech strand of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Section III focuses on the facts of Pearson v. 
Shalala, a 1999 decision in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, that 
focuses the debate on commercial free speech and FDA regulation of 
health claims. Section III outlines the facts and reasoning of the court in 
Pearson. Sections IV and V explain the application of the Supreme 
Court's Central Hudson test and its failure to encompass the complexity 
of interests involved in this regulatory/free speech analysis. This section 
will also explain why the Supreme Court should use the failure of the 
Central Hudson test in this context to revise its notion of commercial 
speech protection to better suit the government and public interests 
involved. Section VI provides a summary of the author's reasons why the 
agency should revise its standard of regulation in such cases in order to 
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653 (1993). 
5. ld. 
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comply with the First Amendment, and why the agency should 
reconsider its determination that mixed categories of speech, such as 
health claims, should be provided a lower degree of First Amendment 
protection than other categories of speech. The section will close by 
suggesting that dietary supplements should be subjected to safety 
approval by the FDA, while health claims should be permitted without 
prior restraint and removal upon proof of falsity. Section VII concludes 
the article. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The First Amendment and the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
As noted earlier, the Bill of Rights was added as a quick addendum 
to the Constitution in order to assuage fears of an overbearing federal 
government and thereby to coax the states to ratify the Constitution. 6 
Consequently, the Founders did not fully explicate the meaning of the 
terms used therein.7 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," and the definition of 
the term "speech" is continuously evolving through the Supreme Court's 
analysis in relevant cases. 
Although the definition of speech, therefore, must by necessity be a 
creation of the Court, one thing is clear: neither the plain language of the 
Constitution nor the debates of the Founders differentiate between the 
full First Amendment protection of "pure" speech and the lesser degree 
of protection used for subcategories such as commercial speech, deemed 
by the Court to be of less social worth.8 This valuation of speech is 
purely a creation of the Court.9 
While the Court has long recognized that, at times, a government 
interest may justify the restriction of speech based on time, place and 
manner, several justices, most notably Holmes and Brandeis, warned 
against the evils of an over-censoring, patronistic government. 10 Scholars 
and jurists alike, however, almost unanimously concede that the ability 
6. See Bork, supra note 2, at 22. 
7. See id. 
8. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I, 
6-7 (1986). 
9. Some scholars even suggest the Founders did not ignore the high value of commercial 
speech at all but valued it as highly as political expression. See Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in 
Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for 
Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1647 (1997). 
10. See Brandeis' discussion in Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring), cited in John M. Blim, Free Speech and Health Claims under the NLEA of 
1990, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 733,749 n.l27 (1994); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371; Abramf, 250 
U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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of the government to restrain free speech does not merely exist when "an 
immediate check is required to save the country." 11 Government interests 
such as the protection of public health and safety have traditionally 
justified extensions of government regulatory authority .12 
As Richard Posner noted in a Suffolk University Law Review article, 
"the state must be allowed to restrain speech if necessary in order to 
avert lesser catastrophes." 13 To 'avert' these 'lesser catastrophes,' the 
Court has attempted to create a value system with core speech most 
strongly exhibit[ing] the qualities of a public good at the top of the First 
Amendment protection scheme with other lesser categories of speech 
less protected.14 The Court first recognized commercial speech as a 
distinct category worthy of limited protection in a case addressing the 
publication of pharmaceutical prices by Virginia pharmacies. 15 The 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council brought a suit in 1974 to invalidate 
a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists in the state from advertising the 
prices of the drugs. The penalty for advertising drug prices was to be 
found guilty of "unprofessional conduct" for the publication. 16 
The Court defined commercial speech as speech that does "no more 
than propose a commercial transaction." 17 Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the court, relied mainly on the 'free flow of information' theory and the 
notion that if we assume that the First Amendment is "primarily an 
instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy," the 
Court could not devalue "concededly truthful information about entirely 
lawful activity." 18 With this decision, the Court noted that both the 
speaker and the recipients of speech have a right at stake in the free flow 
of commercial information. 19 The Court weighed the competing 
government and public interests at issue and invalidated the Virginia 
statute, determining that the court's patronistic reasons for restraining 
. . bl 20 commumcatwn were unaccepta e. 
II. Abram~. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
12. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 
(1986); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,485 (1995). 
13. Posner, supra note 8, at 6. 
14. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Ronwnce: Public Choice and the First 
Amendment, !05 HARV. L. REV. 554, 562 (1991). 
15. Virginia State Bd. tif Pharnwcy, 425 U.S. at 748. 
16. See id. at 752. 
17. /d. at 752 n.2. 
18. /d. at 773. 
19. See id. at 756. 
20. See Blackmun's statement that 
the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their 
being kept in ignorance ... There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that 
people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that 
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While the Court deemed commercial speech worthy of limited 
protection under the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Justice Blackmun was 
quick to assert that the time, place and manner restrictions imposed on 
pure speech were equally applicable, if not more so, in determining 
whether a regulation improperly abridges a commercial free speech 
right. 21 In addition, Justice Blackmun presented two reasons why the 
Court was choosing to provide a lesser degree of protection to 
commercial speech than to other forms of expression: (1) commercial 
speech is "more easily verifiable by its disseminator" and (2) commercial 
speech may be "more durable than other kinds [of speech]."22 As a result 
of this objective verifiability and hardiness of commercial speech, Justice 
Blackmun clearly stated that commercial speech is not entitled to the 
usual prohibition against prior restraint, and that a speaker may be 
required to attach disclaimers or other counter information to the speech 
in order to combat possible deceptive effects.23 Notwithstanding this 
lesser protection, however, the Court forcibly agreed with the lower 
court's determination that a State may not "completely suppress the 
dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful 
activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its 
. . ,24 
rectptents. 
While the Court clearly recognized commercial speech as a category 
deserving some degree of First Amendment protection in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun's opinion did not formulate a 
clear standard of scrutiny for evaluating regulations that abridge 
commercial speech. However, in 1980, in the case of Central Hudson 
Gas v. Public Service Commission, the court formulated an intermediate 
standard of scrutiny it would apply to regulations of commercial 
speech.25 The Central Hudson controversy arose during a severe fuel 
shortage during which the New York Public Service Commission 
prohibited electrical utilities from publishing promotional advertising 
that heightened the aggregate demand for electricity. 26 In this case, the 
government interest in regulation was substantially higher than the 
patronistic interest asserted by the state of Virginia in Virginia State 
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them. 
Jd. at 769-70. 
21. See id. at 771. 
22. /d. at 772 n.24. 
23. See id. 
24. /d. at 773. 
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
26. Seeid.at560. 
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Board of Pharmacy. Before setting out the standard, the Court noted that 
"[t]he protection available for particular commercial expression turns on 
the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests 
served by the regulation."27 The Court then stated the test as follows: (1) 
Is the communication worthy of First Amendment protection because it 
is concerning lawful activity and not misleading? (2) Is the asserted 
governmental interest substantial? (3) Does the regulation directly 
advance the governmental interest asserted? (4) Is the regulation not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?28 If the answers to 
prongs one and two are yes, the court will proceed to prongs three and 
four. Otherwise, the analysis ends at prong two. The court determined in 
Central Hudson that the Public Service Commission regulation did not 
pass this test and was therefore invalid as a violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment.29 
From the very adoption of the test in Central Hudson, however, 
several members of the Court noted the ambiguity inherent in its 
language30 and the difficulty in justifying the difference in the level of 
protection accorded to commercial speech and that accorded to other 
forms of truthful, non-misleading speech. In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Blackmun stated that "[n]o differences between commercial 
speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial 
speech in order to influence public conduct through the manipulation of 
the availability of information."31 In other words, the government should 
no more be able to suppress information in order to influence consumer 
choice in a situation involving commercial speech than it may suppress 
core speech, such as political speech, in order to influence public 
conduct. 
Also in 1980, the Court decided Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, in which Justice Rehnquist made his much-
debated statement that the "greater power to completely ban casino 
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of 
casino gambling."32 In this case, the Court determined under the Central 
Hudson scheme that the Puerto Rican legislature's regulation disallowing 
the advertisement of gambling in Puerto Rico was valid under the First 
Amendment. 33 The government interest asserted under the Central 
Hudson test was the legislature's belief that gambling would produce 
27. /d. at 563. 
28. !d. at 566. 
29. See id. at 572. 
30. See also Blim, supra note 10, at 747-49. 
31. Central Hudson, 448 U.S. at 578. 
32. 478 U.S. at 345-46. 
33. See id. at 332. 
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"serious and harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the 
Puerto Rican citizens."34 Although Justice Rehnquist's "greater/lesser" 
formulation seems excessively broad enough to encompass nearly all 
commercial speech, this logic has been limited in subsequent cases by 
the notion that this principle is applicable only when the commercial 
activity involved is never in the citizens' best interest.35 
Further cases established the concept that while inherently 
misleading communication is not protected under the Central Hudson 
standard, potentially misleading information is protected to some extent. 
If truthful advertising related to lawful activities is potentially 
misleading, "the States may not place an absolute prohibition . . . on 
potentially misleading information if the information also may be 
presented in a way that is not deceptive.'.36 However, in Board of 
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, a 1989 case, the 
Court determined that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the 
appropriateness of the means to the government's asserted end, was to be 
evaluated under a "reasonable fit" standard and not a "least restrictive 
means" standard.37 
The Court has recognized in subsequent cases that complete 
suppression is often not acceptable under the Fox "reasonable fit" 
standard. For instance, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona38, a 1977 case, 
the Supreme Court had disapproved of the State Bar's decision to 
discipline several attorneys who advertised their fees for certain legal 
services. The Court took this action because it disapproved of the notion 
that "the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of 
advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted 
with correct but incomplete information."39 The Court went on to 
determine that the advertisement was not inherently misleading and 
therefore, the "preferred remedy is more disclosure rather than less."40 In 
other words, if complete suppression is chosen over disclaimers, the 
government regulation is subject to question because it used the most 
restrictive means available to meet the government purpose. Later cases, 
such as In Re R.M.J, decided by the Court in 1982, further clarify the 
Court's position that the states may regulate commercial speech "in a 
34. Jd. at 341. 
35. Blim, supra note 10, at 756. 
36. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650,655 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
37. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
38. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
39. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977). 
40. /d. at 376. 
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manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further 
substantial interests."41 
B. History of Congressional Legislation and FDA Regulation 
The courts have held that health claims on dietary supplement labels 
fall under the rubric of commercial speech, according it a lesser level of 
scrutiny than 'pure' speech,42 although the wisdom of this decision is 
questioned by many scholars who argue that health labels are partly 
informational and partly commercial and should therefore be protected 
under a more rigorous level of scrutiny.43 The federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has long taken a hostile stance against the 
inclusion of health claims on dietary supplement labels. A dietary 
supplement was classified as a drug under the Pure Food and Drugs Act 
of 1906,44 if it was "intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or 
prevention of disease of either man or other animals."45 However, the 
courts paid little heed to the food/drug classification and few health 
claims were litigated under the 1906 Act because the burden of proving 
falsity and fraudulence rested on the govemment.46 With the federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,47 however, the definition of a 
'drug' was extended and the government's burden of proof was lessened 
to require only proof of falsity, and not fraudulence.48 
The Drug Amendments of 1962 required pre-market approval of the 
effectiveness and safety of a drug with the burden of proof placed on the 
sponsor. The standard of proof was so high that it was nearly impossible 
for a health claim for a food or supplement to satisfy the required proof 
of a drug claim.49 Because of this, health claims were virtually prohibited 
under the 1962 Amendments. The FDA determined in 1979, after 
holding joint hearings with the FTC on health claims, that scientific 
methods of verifying health claims were not sufficiently sophisticated at 
41. In re R.M.l., 455 U.S. 191,207 (1982). 
42. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983). 
43. See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific 
Expression and the Twilixht Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433 (1990); R. George 
Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 
137 (1994); Edward Dunkelberger & Sarah E. Taylor, The NLEA, Health Claims and the First 
Amendment, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 631 (1993). 
44. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
45. !d. See also Richard M. Cooper, et a!., History of Health Claims Rexulation, 45 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 655, 658. 
46. See id. 
47. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 ( 1938). 
48, See Cooper, eta!., supra note 45, at 658. 
49. See id. 
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that time to justify the inclusion of health claims on products without 
. I d" so nus ea mg consumers: 
In 1984, Kelloggs opened the floodgates of health claims in 
advertising by placing a claim on boxes of All-Bran stating that the 
cereal was high in fiber and that the National Cancer Institute had 
established that a high-fiber diet could reduce the risk of some types of 
cancer.
51 Kelloggs did not consult with the FDA before attaching the 
claim to its cereal boxes, yet the agency took no action against Kelloggs. 
Other manufacturers interpreted this lack of FDA action as an invitation 
to flood the marketplace with health-related claims as a part of their 
marketing schemes. 52 While this led to an increase in healthier foods and 
more health information in the market, it also encouraged many 
companies to attach unsubstantiated and even misleading health claims 
to their products under the notion that the FDA would take no action. 53 In 
1987, the FDA proposed a rule that would have permitted health claims 
relating to "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of human 
disease" to be used without requiring FDA pre-approval.54 Although the 
flexibility apparent in the 1987 proposed rule and the outpouring of new 
health claims that followed the Kelloggs affair had the positive effect of 
increasing the number of healthful foods on the market, the proposed rule 
spurred industry concerns, and numerous comments were submitted to 
the FDA encouraging the agency to develop a definitive health claim 
policy. 55 In response to this outpouring of concern, the FDA prepared to 
propose new regulations in 1990 that would substantially return the 
approval of health claims to the hostile atmosphere that existed before 
the Kelloggs phenomenon.56 This attempt, however, was cut short by 
Congress's passage of the Nutrition and Labeling Act of 1900. 
In 1990, Congress anticipated the proposed system of policies under 
preparation by the FDA, and passed its own regulation, the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA).57 Industry lobbyists and 
scholarly commentators who had cautioned about First Amendment 
problems during the notice and comment period for the FDA proposed 
regulations were virtually ignored by Congress during the debate 
preceding passage of the NLEA.58 With the passage of the NLEA, 
50. See id. at 662. 
51. See Blim, supra note 10, at 736; Cooper, et al., supra note 41, at 662-63. 
52. See Cooper, et al., supra note 43, at 662-63 ( 1990). 
53. H.R. Rep. 101-980, at 7 and 23 (1990). 
54. See Cooper, et al., supra note 43, at 661. 
55. See id. at 666. 
56. See id. at 691. 
57. Pub. L. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990). 
58. See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 632-33. These cautions were presumably 
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Congress required the FDA to formulate regulations for health claims 
within twelve months under a "significant scientific agreement 
standard."59 The FDA was directed to use a rulemaking process rather 
than a case-by-case, adjudicatory method to approve or disapprove of 
health claims, and Congress left the working definition of the 
"significant scientific agreement" standard to the FDA's discretion, 
leaving the agency free to "require near unanimity among scientists" 
regarding the validity of a claim before the agency would approve its 
60 
use. 
Under the final FDA NLEA regulations, a dietary supplement 
manufacturer may only include a health claim on the label of the 
supplement if that health claim has been previously approved in FDA 
regulations.61 If the health claim has not been approved in an FDA 
regulation, the organization may petition the FDA for an allowance, 
abandon the claim, or seek judicial review of the agency's decision.62 
The FDA has only approved eight health claims to date, and only one 
seems to be applicable to dietary supplements,63 thus illustrating the 
agency's immense power to limit access to health information.64 The 
agency codified its "procedure" for authorizing health claims in 21 
C.P.R.§ 101.14(c) as follows: 
[T]he FDA will establish a regulation approving a health claim only 
when it determines, based on the totality of publicly available scientific 
evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in 
a manner which is consistent with generally recognized scientific 
procedures and principles), that there is significant scientific agreement 
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to 
evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.65 
In practice, this standard of "significant scientific agreement" has 
proven to be ill-defined and virtually impossible to satisfy, as will be 
seen below.66 In addition, if a company attaches an unapproved health 
claim to a label, this "exposes the company and its officials to criminal 
overlooked in an attempt to accommodate varying heated viewpoints among legislators regarding the 
policy at issue in health claim regulation. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 101-980 (1990), for a clear 
view of the partisan divisiveness in Congress regarding the NLEA and FDA health claims regulation 
in general. 
59. Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 633. 
60. Blim, supra note 10, at 739. 
61. See id. at 740. 
62. See id. at 742. 
63. See Melinda Ledden Sidak, Dietary Supplements and Commercial Speech, 48 FooD & 
DRUG L.J. 441,450-51. 
64. See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 635. 
65. Health Claims: General Requirements, 21 C.P.R.§ 101.14(c). 
66. See Sidak, supra note 63, at 452-61. 
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prosecution" even if the claim is "truthful and fully substantiated" but 
merely failed to meet the FDA's discretionary standard.67 This result 
seems to stand in clear violation of First Amendment principles. 
III. PEARSON V. SHALALA 
Durk Peterson and Sandy Shaw, dietary supplement marketers, 
desired to present four health claims on their dietary supplement labels. 
The labels read as follows: (I) consumption of antioxidant vitamins may 
reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancer; (2) consumption of fiber may 
reduce the risk of colorectal cancer; (3) consumption of fatty acids may 
reduce the risk of coronary heart disease; (4) .8 mg. of folic acid in a 
dietary supplement is more effective in reducing the risk of neural tube 
defects than a lower amount in foods in common form.68 The FDA 
refused to certify any of these claims, although it later allowed a more 
general health claim regarding the foliate-neural tube defect claim 
purportedly because of political pressure, and not additional scientific 
justification.69 The FDA explained that the rejection of these health 
claims was based, not on lack of scientific evidence of their verity, but 
rather because they "failed to give rise to 'significant scientific 
agreement."' 70 The agency, however, failed to explain how it defined or 
measured "significant scientific agreement."71 
Pearson and Shaw brought an action in federal district court seeking 
relief from this FDA decision based on three main theories: (1) the FDA 
violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to employ a less 
restrictive means of regulation, thus allowing them to include health 
claims on labels along with disclaimers stating that the FDA had not 
approved the claims; (2) the FDA failed to explain the meaning and 
measurement of "significant scientific agreement" and effectively 
imposed a prior restraint on communication that both violates the 
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and deprives them of 
their liberty in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process; 
and (3) the FDA engaged in arbitrary and capricious action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to "give some 
definitional content" to "significant scientific agreement."72 The district 
court rejected all of these claims.73 
67. See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 634-36. 
68. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 652. 
69. See id. at 653. The FDA denies that mere political pressure caused the agency to approve 
the foliate-neural tube and asserts that new scientific studies justified the approval. /d. at 654. 
70. /d. at 653. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. at 660. 
73. See id. at 654. 
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While the D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged the merits of the 
First and Fifth Amendment claims and extensively discussed the First 
Amendment argument in some detail, it declined to decide the case based 
on these theories. The agency action was a clear violation of the APA 
and, therefore, consideration of these more substantive claims was not 
necessary to reach the court's desired result in this case.74 The court 
reversed the decision of the district court and remanded to the district 
court with instructions to remand to the FDA for reconsideration of 
Pearson and Shaw's health claims.75 
The court did, however, lend credence to Pearson and Shaw's First 
and Fifth Amendment claims, noting the probability that these claims 
may have merit and may be reached in a case in which the APA claim 
does not exist. This case was the first seriously considered challenge of 
the NLEA based on First and Fifth Amendment claims to reach a U.S. 
Court of Appeals where the issues were ripe for decision and the parties 
had standing to sue. Thus, the fact that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the merit of these Constitutional challenges to the Act makes 
it more likely that similar challenges will be brought in the near future if 
the problems with the Act are not remedied through new legislation or 
FDA regulatory solutions. 
IV. THE CENTRALHUDSONTEST 
A. First Amendment Violations 
In its evaluation of the First Amendment claims, the court first noted 
that the health claims are to be evaluated under the commercial speech 
doctrine.76 Therefore, the court's first inquiry was concerning the use of 
disclaimers as an effective but less restrictive means of regulation than 
the FDA's choice to completely suppress health claims on labeling. The 
court considered two arguments made by the government in this area: ( 1) 
the health claims are "inherently misleading" because they failed to pass 
the muster of the "significant scientific agreement" standard and 
therefore they are not entitled to any First Amendment protection and, in 
the alternative, (2) the health claims are merely potentially misleading 
under the Central Hudson analysis so the government may completely 
ban the publication of health claims, without even considering the less 
restrictive means of attaching disclaimers when the claims do not meet 
the "significant scientific agreement" standard. 77 
74. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660. 
75. See id. at 661. 
76. See id. at 655. 
77. See id. 
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The court first derailed the government's argument that the health 
claims were inherently misleading, based on the notion that this was a 
patronistic argument underestimating the sophistication and ability of 
consumers to make choices based on the available information.78 Then, 
turning to the possibility of characterizing the health claims as 
"potentially misleading" under the Central Hudson scheme, the court 
determined that commercial speech may be a proper classification of the 
health claims because of the difficulty that the independent consumer 
would face in trying to independently verify the claim and the possibility 
that the consumer might assume that the FDA had approved the claims 
attached to a label.79 
Because the health claims could possibly be classified as "potentially 
misleading," the court was obliged to apply the next three parts of the 
Central Hudson test. The court determined that the "asserted government 
interests" in this instance, "protection of public health" and "protection 
of consumer fraud", were "substantial."80 However, the court faced the 
last two steps of the test with more difficulty. At this point in the 
analysis, the test requires that the court determine whether the regulation 
"directly advances the government interest asserted"81 and whether the 
government regulation is a "reasonable"82means to achieve the desired 
end. 
As to the first asserted government interest, protection of public 
health, the court again noted that the dietary supplements at issue are not 
dangerous in themselves and the government cannot completely suppress 
a communication merely to cause the consumer to better spend his or her 
health dollars. Once again, this was based on the reasoning that the court 
should be wary of government regulations that attempt to hide 
information from the public as the government acts for 'the consumer's 
own good.' 83 Therefore, the court's analysis of the FDA's public health 
argument ended at the third step in the Central Hudson analysis. Here, 
however, the court saw more merit in the FDA's consumer fraud 
argument, that complete suppression of health claims would prevent 
consumer fraud and confusion, and thus "directly advance the 
78. See id. The court cited the Peel opinion which states that this patronistic method of 
determining that a communication is inherently misleading is tantamount to a determination that 
consumers are "no more discriminating than the audience for children's television." !d. (quoting Peel 
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 1 OS ( 1990)). 
79. Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 655. 
80. !d. at 656. 
81. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
82. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
83. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656. 
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governmental interest asserted."84 Therefore, the court subjected the 
consumer fraud argument to the "reasonable fit" standard of the fourth 
prong of the Central Hudson test. 
As a part of the fourth prong analysis, the court noted that, under 
Supreme Court precedent, even when the court determines that the 
government's regulation "reasonably fits" its purpose, the regulation 
does not pass muster if it is "substantially excessive" and disregards a 
"far less restrictive and more precise means."85 Under this reasoning, the 
court stated that the Supreme Court, in a series of commercial speech 
cases, has affirmed its dedication to the idea that the preference is for 
more communication rather than less, making a disclaimer preferable to 
complete suppression if this less restrictive means fulfills the 
government's purpose.86 The court expressed confidence that disclaimers 
would meet the government's purpose in this instance, but left this 
decision to the discretion of the agency on remand. 
The court next gave a cursory glance to Pearson and Shaw's 
argument that the regulations were a "prior restraint" on speech and, as 
such, were prohibited under the First Amendment. Appellants argued 
that the failure of the agency to sufficiently define the phrase "significant 
scientific agreement" was effectively a prior restraint because it does not 
inform labelers of the method by which the FDA determines that a label 
satisfies the "significant scientific agreement" standard.87 In other words, 
the appellants had the burden of proving "significant scientific 
agreement," but they were unaware of the standard of proof required by 
the FDA. This argument was largely skimmed over because the 
appellants did not fully articulate their argument on this issue, but the 
court was quick to note that this may have been a fruitful claim if 
Pearson and Shaw had pursued this argument further. 88 
B. The Unarticulated Standard 
Continuing its analysis that the FDA's failure to give some "content" 
to the "significant scientific agreement" standard, the court next turned to 
Pearson and Shaw's argument that they had been deprived of a liberty 
under the Fifth Amendment without due process.89 Pearson and Shaw 
had argued that they had not been accorded sufficient due process 
84. !d. at 656. 
85. !d. at 658 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 479). 
86. See id. at 657. 
87. !d. at 660. 
88. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 660. 
89. See id. 
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because of the vagueness of the agency's "significant scientific 
agreement" standard.90 However, the court did not fully consider this 
argument because it determined that this vagueness also made the FDA's 
action "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA and that Pearson and 
Shaw would receive the same relief under the APA that they would be 
entitled to under the Fifth Amendment.91 
Although the court required the FDA to give content to the term 
"significant scientific agreement" on remand, the court clearly stated that 
the FDA was not required to provide a complete definition in this one 
instance.92 Congress had granted the FDA authority to regulate health 
claims on dietary supplements through a system of regulatory 
rulemaking, not adjudication, and this grant of authority presupposed that 
the agency could create a working definition on a "sub-regulation by 
sub-regulation" basis.93 In the end, the court only required that the 
regulated class be able to "perceive the principles which are guiding 
0 ,94 
agency actwn. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Pearson highlights several of the problems with the current 
formulation of health claim regulation in the context of First Amendment 
analysis and the public interests involved in the publication of health 
claims. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals did not delve to the bottom of 
the situation in this instance to determine the constitutionality of the 
FDA's sub-regulations under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act 
of 1990, because the relief sought by Pearson and Shaw was available 
through a less drastic method.95 However, the dicta of the court's opinion 
lends credence to the idea that future litigation may invalidate the FDA's 
Nutritional Labeling and Education Act procedure if (1) the claimants 
fully explicate their First and Fifth Amendment causes of action and (2) 
the court chooses to afford relief under a constitutional rubric rather than 
an APA violation.96 While there is clearly a need for FDA regulation of 
dietary supplements, the FDA's heavy-handed NLEA regulations both 
undermine the legislative purpose behind the NLEA and abridge the 
constitutional rights of those class members affected by the regulation, 
the speakers, and the public. 
90. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 660. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 661. 
93. See id. 
94. /d. 
95. See id. at 660. 
96. See id. See also Pearson v. Shalala, 172 F.3d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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A. Trends in the Regulation of Dietary Supplement Health Claims 
Congress clearly expressed the government's interest in regulating 
health claims in dietary supplements in its "findings and purposes" for 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994. This piece of 
legislation clarified that health claims for dietary supplements under the 
NLEA are to be determined under the same standards as are health 
claims for foods. 97 According to national studies conducted in 1994, at 
least fifty percent of Americans consume dietary supplements with the 
purpose of improving their nutrition.98 The proliferation of health claims 
following the Kelloggs claim in the 1980s itself substantiates the idea 
that healthy foods and supplements are big business in America.99 In 
1994, studies estimated that 600 dietary supplement manufacturers 
produce 4,000 products and account for annual sales of "at least four 
billion dollars." 100 This wide-scale use of supplements may be attributed 
in part to an increase in scientific validation of the health benefits of 
supplement use. While the FDA and the healthcare community have 
traditionally been hostile to the dietary supplement industry, scientific 
studies have shown links between supplement use and disease 
prevention. 101 These findings further emphasize the interests of the 
government and the public in "improv[ing] the health status of United 
States citizens" by supplementing traditional health care with more 
holistic health practices to reverse the increase in healthcare spending, 
which had reached one trillion dollars annually in 1994. 102 Indicators 
show that Americans will continue this escalated use of dietary 
supplements and therefore the government should have an interest in 
ensuring that the public is making health decisions based on the most 
reliable information available. 
This governmental interest cuts both ways in the First Amendment 
debate over FDA approval of health claims. The question is whether the 
government should serve as the gatekeeper for health claims to better 
ensure their accuracy, or whether the government's role should be to 
protect the free flow of health information under the First Amendment 
and to proliferate reliable information about dietary supplements to 
counter less reliable claims that the free flow of information allows into 
97. SeeS. REP. NO. 103-410, at I. 
98. See 140 Cong. Rec. H11173-02, H11173 (daily ed.). 
99. See H.R. REP. No. 101-980, at 7. 
100. B. Clair Eliason, et al., What Physicians Can Learn from Consumers of Dietary 
Supplements, 48 J. FAM. PRAC., 459 (1999); 140 Cong. Rec. Hlll73-02, Hlll73. 
I 0 I. See Sidak, supra note 63, at 441. 
102. See 140 Cong. Rec. at H11173. 
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the public discourse. These competing interests are confronted in 
Pearson and the underlying legislation involved in this case. 
While the notion that health claim based marketing is big business in 
America seems to validate the idea that the courts should apply the 
Central Hudson commercial speech test to health claims regulation, this 
conclusion is doubtful on closer analysis. If any speech with a relation to 
industry can be classified as commercial speech, one might asks where 
this places claims related to the science of traditional medicine. Clearly 
there is a conflict between two areas of big business in America, 
traditional and nontraditional healthcare, and the traditional medical 
community is now beginning to take note of the idea that they must be 
aware of nontraditional healthcare solutions, such as dietary 
supplements, if they are to remain as reliable sources of health 
information for their patients. 103 Congress, the FDA, and the courts must 
look to the medical model of information dissemination to determine 
whether the FDA's method of health claim sifting is appropriate under 
the First Amendment free-flow theory. Where science and commerce 
meet, the courts and the government, administrative and legislative, must 
establish a new concept of speech protection that is more thorough than 
the commercial speech standard in order to allow public access to the 
noncommercial, scientific component of such speech. 104 The remainder 
of this note will explore how this may be accomplished under the Central 
Hudson regime or under the First Amendment's protection of pure 
speech. 
B. Commercial Speech Analysis 
1. The first prong ofthe Central Hudson Test 
The court in Pearson unquestioningly assumed that health claims 
should be evaluated under the commercial speech scheme based on the 
Central Hudson test. 105 The appropriateness of this categorization is 
questionable, but even under the commercial speech standard, the FDA 
NLEA regulation fails to meet the test on several grounds. 
First, the Central Hudson test is intended to protect communications 
that are true and non-misleading. The Supreme Court's entire reason for 
creating the subcategory of commercial speech and providing it less 
protection than pure speech was based on the notion expressed by Justice 
103. See Eliason, et al., supra note 100, at 459. 
104. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberatin!? Commercial Speech: Product Labeling 
Controls and the First Amendment, 47 Fi..A. L. REV. 63, 90 ( 1995). 
I 05. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 655. 
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Blackmun that commercial speech is somehow more objectively 
"verifiable by the disseminator." 106 As Pearson demonstrates, health 
claims may be objectively verifiable by the producer, Pearson and Shaw 
in this case, but the truth of the claim is of little import because the FDA 
imposes a subjective standard of verification on the health claim before it 
is even published. In Pearson, there was not a "dearth of evidence" to 
verify the health claim, 107 but, rather, the FDA imposed an arbitrary 
subjective standard of truth. 
Pearson and Shaw's health claims failed to meet an impossibly high 
standard of "significant scientific agreement"-impossible because the 
FDA failed even to specify in this instance what quality and quantity of 
evidence would be required to objectively verify the health claim. The 
very idea of a "significant scientific agreement" standard without 
definition presupposes that the FDA is more capable of weighing the 
sources of scientific information than are the scientific community and 
the public. 
This authority of the FDA to effectively declare the unreliability of a 
health claim places the FDA in the position of a "peer review mechanism 
for the scientific community." 108 This extreme grant of administrative 
authority is not consistent with either the concept of democracy or the 
modern skepticism that industry lobbyists control the administrative 
state. Scholars note that the New Deal notion of the 'all-knowing 
administrative expert' has been replaced with the idea of the agency as 
an educator that encourages "genuinely informed choices." 109 Arbitrarily 
determining supposed objective truth by sifting it through the sieve of 
subjective FDA review does not further the purpose of ensuring informed 
choice. An agency such as the FDA should not be given the authority to 
subjectively determine the truth of a statement under the lesser protective 
standard afforded to commercial speech, when the justification for the 
lesser protection substantially rests on the idea that commercial speech is 
more objectively verifiable than noncommercial speech. The 
responsibility of verifying the claims should fall on the shoulders of the 
supplement marketers and the experts in the traditional medical industry 
who are natural competitors in this situation. Otherwise, the disseminator 
is deprived of the right to prove truth in this instance, as Pearson and 
Shaw's experience demonstrates. 
106. Vir!(inia State Bd. of Phari1Ulcy. 425 U.S. at 751 n.2. Blackmun's footnote explanation, as 
discussed earlier in the Note, also specifies that the differentiation is due to the increased durability 
of commercial speech. 
107. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653. 
l 08. Noah, supra note l 04, at 96. 
109. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 653. 
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The FDA similarly fails to justify its regulation under the second 
notion inherent in the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the concept 
that misleading commercial communication is not worthy of protection. 
Clearly the health claims in this instance are not inherently misleading. 110 
When the FDA can only make a subjective judgment about the truth of a 
claim, it should not declare the claim to be potentially misleading merely 
because the agency believes itself to be more capable than the average 
American to determine the value and accuracy of the claim. While the 
average citizen may not have the resources or expertise to independently 
verify a claim, the traditional medical industry and pharmaceutical 
industry do have the resources, expertise, and motive to destroy the 
credibility of false claims. When the same evidence of the claim's truth 
or falsity is available to both the FDA and the public, the individual, and 
not the FDA, should be considered to be the best judge of his or her own 
best interest. 
2. The final prongs of the Central Hudson test 
After the court determines that the speech is not false or inherently 
misleading, the remainder of the Central Hudson analysis is based on the 
nexus between the government interest and the regulation. This is where 
the health claims analysis is blurred because it appears that Congress had 
a different interest or purpose under its NLEA legislation than did the 
FDA in its NLEA regulations. The Central Hudson test doesn't account 
for the philosophical shift occurring somewhere between Congressional 
legislation and agency discretion. When it is unclear whether the 
purposes of the FDA and Congress coincide, Congress's purpose should 
preempt the agency's purpose because the agency is only acting under 
authority delegated by the legislative branch. Congress has repeatedly 
recognized in its legislation involving dietary supplements that (1) the 
FDA has historically disfavored dissemination regarding dietary 
supplement health claims, (2) the FDA's NLEA final regulations have 
slowed the flood of permissible health claims to less than a trickle, and 
(3) the FDA has not facilitated Congress's purpose to "provide more 
. f . b 1 " 111 I S m ormatiOn to consumers a out supp ements. n a enate report 
regarding the DSHEA of 1994, Congress noted that FDA NLEA 
regulation and subsequent enforcement attempts have had a chilling 
110. Ironically, the Supreme Court's inclusion of merely potentially misleading speech in 
Central Hudson embodies the patronistic reasoning that the Supreme Court claims to abhor in its 
commercial speech jurisprudence, with Bates standing as the seminal case in recognizing this idea. 
Bates, 433 U.S. at 375. 
Ill. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 35. 
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effect on commercial communication that is based on a well-grounded 
belief in its verity. 112 
Clearly the FDA is not furthering the superior government interest 
with its NLEA regulations-consumers are being provided with less 
health claim information and producers are being subjected to a prior 
restraint on speech. The courts cannot allow the FDA's purely patronistic 
interest to suffice as a "substantial interest" under the Central Hudson 
test when it conflicts with the interest of Congress in increasing the flow 
of health information and the public's interest in receiving health 
information substantiated by a respectable degree of evidence. Therefore, 
the questions as to whether the regulation directly advances the 
government interest and uses a reasonable means to accomplish that end 
must be answered negatively in this instance. In fact, prior to health 
claim approval, dietary supplements are subject to safety approval if they 
contain a new ingredient. 113 The FDA can determine that the product 
itself is unsafe for sale and subsequently remove it from the market; thus, 
while supplements have been shown to be toxic at certain consumption 
levels, the FDA cannot claim that its NLEA health claims regulations are 
protecting the public from any real harm other than the consumer's own 
f I . d 114 au ty JU gment. 
3. The reasoning ofPosadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico applied to this case 
While the FDA argues under the reasoning of Posadas that the 
greater power to regulate the product assumes the lesser power to 
regulate commercial speech about the product, the health claims scenario 
is easily distinguishable from the fact situation in Posadas. 115 In 
Posadas, the commercial activity, gambling, could have no positive 
112. See id. "FDA presently writes to companies warning that severe enforcement action may 
follow if a company does not cease ... making claims that the FDA deems violative. Under current 
law, FDA may or may not do something further to enforce that opinion. A company wishing to 
challenge the assertion by FDA may not do so because the decision is not "final agency action" and 
therefore not ripe for review ... A company is then forced to make possibly disastrous economic 
choices based upon a constant fear that enforcement may follow. A well-grounded belief in the 
viability of a claim ... will often be overcome by the cost of defending an action that may not be 
filed." (Congress attempted to solve this problem by requiring that enforcement action occur within 
60 days of receipt of the threat from the FDA.). 
113. Stephen H. McNamara, Dietary Supplements of Botanicals and Other Substances: A New 
Era of Rel{ulation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341-48 (1995). 
114. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 659. (citing Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't. of Bus. and Prof! Regulation, 
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994), "If the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force, 
we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant the [government's] 
burden to demonstrate that the harm it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate 
them to a material degree." Ibanez, 5I2 U.S. at 146.). 
115. See Pearson, 172 F.3d at 73. 
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effects on public health and safety; therefore, restricting advertising for 
gambling would not withhold possibly beneficial information from the 
public. Here, however, both the product itself and the suppressed 
information have potential health benefits for the public. The Posadas 
approach is thus distinguished from this case. In fact, the idea that the 
FDA can prohibit the sale of dietary supplements if its ingredients do not 
meet safety standards further supports the proposition that the FDA is 
merely trying to protect the consumer from his own inefficient healthcare 
spending and not from any real harm threatened by the product itself. 
Thus, the Central Hudson test, accompanied by the clarification of its 
progeny, fails to consider competing government interests and to give 
sufficient weight to the interest of the listener-the public. 
C. Inappropriateness of the Commercial Speech Classification 
Not only does Pearson demonstrate that the Central Hudson test 
fails to sufficiently evaluate essential public and governmental interests 
involved in the regulation of health claims, it also illuminates the 
possibility that: (l) health claims may not be properly classified as 
commercial speech; and (2) the entire idea of the commercial speech 
classification recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy may be 
faulty under First Amendment principles. 
The D.C. Circuit in Pearson skimmed over the classification of 
health claims as commercial speech in one sentence, citing Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products116 as support for this classification. The court in 
Bolger recognized that the core definition of commercial speech 
provided in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, "speech which does 'no 
more than propose a commercial transaction"', 117 is problematic where 
noncommercial content is included with commercial content. However, it 
classified as commercial speech advertisements of contraceptives, which 
advertisements included information on public issues. The 
advertisements/informational brochures were classified as commercial 
speech based on a combination of three factors: (l) the concession that 
the pamphlets were advertisements, (2) the reference to a specific 
product in the pamphlets, and (3) the fact that the distributors had an 
economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets. 118 However, the Court's 
actual motivation in Bolger was to prevent advertisers from superficially 
116. 463U.S.at66-67. 
117. Virginia State Bd. of Pharnwcy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human 
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
118. See Bol,;er, 463 U.S. at 66. 
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including information about public debate in order to latch onto the 
"constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech."1 19 
In the context of Pearson and the broader context of health claims 
regulation, the communication involved is of an entirely different nature 
than that which the Bolger court confronted. A health claim is in itself a 
statement of science, a statement of public health information and a 
statement with a commercial motivation; this more "pure" speech is not 
merely an appended piece of information but is the communication in 
question. 
Critics have consistently noted that the mere fact that a scientific and 
public health statement is communicated for a commercial reason does 
not justify a lesser protection for that statement. 120 They cite a 1978 case, 
Egg Nutrition v. FTC to support this contention. 121 In this case, the court 
determined that an egg industry organization advertisement stating that 
there is no scientific link between egg consumption and heart disease 
was commercial speech because the purpose of the advertisement was to 
induce consumers to buy eggs. 122 Critics then noted that the exact same 
communication would be protected as "pure" speech under the First 
Amendment if it were merely communicated by someone without a 
profit-motive, such as a scientist or medical researcher. 123 
Health claims clearly fall within this category of communications of 
scientific information differentiated from pure speech because the 
speaker has something to gain-a profit-motive-by publishing the 
speech on a label. Thus, the motivations of the speaker, good or bad, that 
are so zealously guarded in the protection of ordinary speech are actually 
the sole reason that scientific communications such as health claims are 
provided less First Amendment protection. This scrutiny of motivation is 
irrational in the health claims context, and some fear that it will have the 
consequence of eroding the protection of "pure" speech, which has 
traditionally been rigorously guarded from suppression based on 
motivation. 124 In fact, some question the entire idea that commercial 
speech should be entitled less protection because it is profit-motivated, 
stating that enriching the public discourse and making money are not 
119. !d. at 68. 
120. See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 55, 128 (1999); Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 
VA. L. REV. 627, 642 (1990); Redish, supra note 43, at 1446. 
121. Egg Nutrition v. FfC, 570 F.2d 157 (7u' Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); 
Kozinski, supra note Ill, at 642; Stern, supra note Ill, at 128. 
122. See Kozinski, supra note Ill, at 642. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
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"mutually exclusive." 125 The very notion that Blackmun expressed in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, that commercial speech is entitled to 
Jess protection because it is more easily objectively verified, may 
damage his reasoning. If one assumes a reasonable and competent public, 
the dangers of commercial speech are far Jess than those posed by "pure" 
speech because the public is naturally more skeptical of commercial 
speech and has more objective tools to test its validity. 126 
In addition, if one believes that the market has a power to direct 
itself, it will only seem obvious that the profit-motive of a dietary 
supplement producer will be contrary to the profit-motive of another 
market player, such as a producer of a supplement with similar effects or 
a pharmaceutical producer, and this opposing market player will expose 
the misleading nature of a health claim in order to promote his own 
product. Thus, competition and profit-motive add an additional check in 
a commercial communication setting that is not necessarily present to 
such a degree in a noncommercial communication setting. 
VI. ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR HEALTH CLAIM PROTECTION AND 
REGULATION 
The intent of this Note is not to suggest that Congress return the 
regulation of health claims back to the "snake oil" stage where anything 
is allowable. Instead, it is intended to suggest that the current system of 
FDA regulation is unduly restrictive when one considers the public 
interests involved and that judicial classification of health claims as 
commercial speech fails to adequately protect this category of mixed 
scientific and commercial communication. In order to create a more 
balanced approach, Congress should require that the FDA thoroughly 
describe its "significant scientific agreement" standard in order to ensure 
that it is not imposing a prior restraint by virtue of its vagueness, as 
Pearson and Shaw asserted in Pearson. In addition, the courts should 
reconsider their classification of mixed scientific and commercial 
communications, such as health claims on dietary supplements, as 
commercial speech and avoid dividing speech along motivational lines. 
Health claims are health information and, therefore, it seems appropriate 
to consider the traditional model of medical communication when 
125. FREDERICK SCHAUER. FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, 158 (University of 
Cambridge Press) (1982). 
126. See Redish, supra note 43, at 1455; Kozinski, supra note 120, at 644. Kozinski, in 
particular, notes that the First Amendment assumes that the public is wise enough to filter the 
political communications of white supremacists and the neo-Nazis, so it is illogical to assume that 
the public would believe that a commercial speaker would take an impartial view of the health 
benefits of his or her product. 
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determining the appropriate method of regulation and judicial 
adjudication. 
A. Medical Model of Communication in a Legal Context 
Physicians have the legal duty to inform their patients of the dangers 
and benefits of proposed medical procedures, prescriptions, and 
recommendations. This notion of informed consent that is so intrinsic to 
the legal doctor/patient relationship is based on the assumption that the 
patient, although less scientifically sophisticated than the physician, 
should be the judge of his or her own best interest. The doctor is 
instructed to "first do no harm" but to provide the patient with all of the 
information material to his or her health. In the end, the party responsible 
for making a final determination as to the course of action is the patient; 
the patient is the final guardian of his or her own health. This paradigm 
should be carried over into the creation of health claims regulation and 
First Amendment protection of health claims. 
Some may argue that Congress and the FDA have already adopted 
this concept by attempting to ensure that the information received by the 
public is accurate and not misleading. However, if we apply this analogy 
more closely, the physician is the dietary supplement producer, the 
supplier of the nontraditional healthcare, and the patient is the consumer. 
While it is true that a supplement producer may not be entitled to as 
much credibility as a physician because of lack of credentials, presence 
of profit-motive, and other factors, one cannot automatically assume that 
Congress and the agency are any more qualified or suited to sift health 
information and to determine the validity of health claims. This idea is 
strengthened by the notion that, although supplement producers are 
acting based on profit-motive, Congress and the agency are acting based 
on industry politics and lobbying efforts by the medical community and 
the pharmaceutical and nutraceutical industry .127 
In addition, because the nature of health claims is often such that 
science cannot conclusively prove the validity of the claims beyond all 
doubt, the government should adopt the philosophy of "epistemological 
humility" and should recognize that it is no more the official determiner 
of "true science" than is the scientific community, the source of these 
health claims.128 Therefore, the FDA should not set the level of proof 
inordinately high in order to preclude health claims as it has in the past. 
127. In fact, the court in Pearson noted that the eventual approval of the neural tube 
defect/folic acid health claim was purportedly based on the pressure of political figures such as 
Senator Hatch, who was undoubtedly influenced by nutraceuticallobbyists. 
128. See Redish, supra note 43, at 1433. 
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Congress has clearly expressed that the purpose of its enabling 
legislation is to increase the flow of health information about dietary 
supplements to facilitate better consumer choice. 129 Any legislation, 
agency regulation, and judicial classification of health claims, should be 
reformed under the assumption that the consumer, the patient so to 
speak, is the final judge of his or her best interest and can only make 
accurate decisions if all of the information is before him or her. While 
the notion that the medical model of communication should be applied 
by analogy to dietary supplement health claims may seem contradictory, 
considering the fact that the FDA more tightly regulates cause and effect 
claims of pharmaceuticals than it does health claims in dietary 
supplements, this is not an insurmountable criticism. Pharmaceuticals 
rightly fit under a more restrictive standard than dietary supplements. 
First, the cause and effect of pharmaceuticals is intended to be more 
immediate and verifiable than the preventative or holistic effects of 
dietary supplements. Second, although dietary supplements may develop 
a toxic effect at extremely high levels of consumption, pharmaceuticals 
are generally more toxic and can have much more severe detrimental 
effects at a low level of use. 130 
B. FDA's "Significant Scientific Agreement" Standard and the First 
Amendment under a Medical Model of Communication 
Because the health claim is merely a scientific statement published 
as a result of a profit-motive, it should be accorded the same First 
Amendment protection that the statement would be accorded if it were 
pronounced by someone, such as a scientist, with no underlying profit-
motive. The most logical solution to the health claims problem is to 
require by regulation that producers desiring to make health claims on 
dietary supplements give notice of the intended claim to the FDA upon 
publication. The health claim would not be subject to the rigorous yet 
vague approval process that is now in place because this is, as Pearson 
and Shaw argued, a prior restraint under the First Amendment. The FDA 
then has access to any published health claims, and in cases where the 
health claim falls in the gray 'potentially misleading' area because it 
does not comport with the weight of available scientific evidence, the 
FDA should be authorized to take adjudicatory action against the 
publisher. 
129. 140 Cong. Rec. at H11173. 
130. See xeneral/y Thomas D. Armsey & Gary A. Green, Nutrition Supplements: Science vs. 
Hype, 25 PHYSICIAN AND SPORTS MED.77 (1997); Position r1{ the American Dietetic Association: 
Vitamin and Mineral Supplementation, 96 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 73 (1996). 
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If the FDA finds that it can prove, to a degree that satisfies a court, 
that the claim is factually false or inherently misleading, then the agency 
can ask the court to enjoin the use of the claim and bring a charge of 
consumer fraud against the producer. The courts should apply a clear 
standard of scientific accuracy such as the judicial "reasonableness" 
standard in order to determine whether a reasonable individual in the 
light of total scientific evidence available could find this claim to be true. 
This "reasonableness" standard is consistent both with the government's 
interest in providing the average consumer with the most factual 
information possible about the dietary supplement and the need to have a 
clearly defined standard of proof that comports with standards of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment. 
If, however, it is impracticable to reclassify health claims as pure 
speech because of the complexity of commercial speech jurisprudence 
and the unwillingness of the Court to rethink the commercial speech 
classification altogether, Congress should at least require the FDA to 
formulate a clear standard of proof and put the burden on the FDA to 
show that the communication would be found judicially false or 
fraudulent. This finding could be connected by statute to a particular 
standard of judicial review under section 706 of the AP A. It is not 
commercially practicable for those in the class affected by the restraint 
on speech (i.e. dietary supplement producers) to guess the nature of the 
FDA's "significant scientific agreement" standard and determine 
whether their claim will survive FDA scrutiny based on a sub-regulation 
by sub-regulation analysis of past FDA action. FDA NLEA regulation as 
it now stands has a chilling effect on health claims communications and 
deprives the dietary supplement producers of their right to free 
expression and the public consumer of truthful and non-misleading 
health information. To provide some level of certainty, Congress should 
require the FDA to define the term "significant" and to give substantive 
content to the entirety of the term "significant scientific agreement" 
beyond the ad hoc, evolutionary sub-regulation approach approved of by 
the D.C. Circuit in Pearson. 
C. Alternate Means to Protect Health and Safety 
Regardless of the First Amendment conflicts inherent in the FDA 
NLEA regulations, the FDA is confronting a very real problem in the 
dietary supplement industry. The recent deaths caused by L-tryptophan 
and ephedrine illustrate that dietary supplements are not as harmless as 
their manufacturers may imply, labeling them as "natural" solutions to 
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health problems. 131 In these instances, the FDA was only permitted to 
step in and remove the suspect supplements from the shelf after the 
damage had already been done. In fact, as Dr. Richard Friedman, 
psychiatrist and director of the Psychopharmacology Clinic at New York 
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, discovered, the FDA "couldn't stop 
[someone] from selling hemlock tea until the bodies piled up." 132 
While the Nutritional Supplements Health and Education Act did not 
amend the FDA's health claim requirements, it placed dietary 
supplements in a twilight zone between foods and drugs. Although both 
food and drug manufacturers have the burden of proving the safety of 
their products to the FDA before placing them on supermarket or 
pharmacy shelves, dietary supplement manufacturers need only prove the 
safety of their products if they contain ingredients that have not been 
present in the food supply prior to October 15, 1994, the date of 
NSHEA's enactment. 133 The FDA may remove a dietary supplement 
from the market if it is deemed adulterated, or poses "a significant or 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury," but the FDA bears the entire 
burden of proving supplement adulteration. 134 This places the FDA in a 
safety policing rather than a preemptive role. While it may be sufficient 
to limit the FDA's authority to regulate health claim communication to 
post publication action, the FDA should have more control over the 
actual sale of supplements. If the FDA has made a preliminary 
determination that the supplement is safe, the First Amendment argument 
that consumers should be able to evaluate published information about 
the product is not difficult to swallow. If, however, the agency has no 
control over the general safety of the product because it was on the 
market before the 1994 enactment of the OSHEA, then the First 
Amendment argument is less convincing. 
While health claims may be difficult to substantiate, it is much easier 
to provide conclusive evidence that a dietary supplement is unsafe by 
subjecting it to pre-market studies. In addition, proof of safety in the case 
of supplements with a market history beginning prior to the 1994 
enactment of OSHEA is even easier because a sufficient amount of time 
has elapsed to allow the dangers of the product to be revealed. Therefore, 
Rehnquist' s argument in Posadas, that the power to regulate the product 
includes the lesser power to regulate speech about that product, may not 
131. See Gina Kalata, The Unwholesome Tale of the Herb Market, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 
1996, at I. 
132. /d. 
133. See McNamara, supra note 13, at 341-38. 
134. Bruce A. Silverglade, The Vitamin Wars-Marketing, Lobbying, and the Consumer, 13 J. 
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 152-54; Anthony Young & I. Scott Bass, The Dietary Supplement 
Health and Education Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285-92 ( 1995). 
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be as inapplicable to this case as it may seem on first glance. If the FDA 
can keep the product off the shelf because it is unsafe, they should do so 
and avoid the First Amendment debate over health claims. If the FDA, 
however, has the power to keep the supplement off the market based on 
objective evaluations of safety and yet considers the product sufficiently 
safe to remain in the market, the idea of allowing uncertain health claims 
on products should not be alarming, especially considering the court's 
allowance of disclaimers in such instances. This solution gives the FDA 
the ability to protect health and safety by keeping unsafe products off the 
market while allowing the responsible consumer access to possibly 
truthful information about products that pass that safety test and may 
provide valuable health benefits. If a product is determined to be safe by 
the FDA, a false statement about its possible health benefits is not 
particularly dangerous and will at most cause harm to the consumer's 
pocketbook if it is allowed to remain on a label until the FDA proves it 
false. There seems to be no reason beyond government patronism to deny 
the consumer access to possibly beneficial health information about a 
product that has been declared safe. 
Congress should revise its stance on dietary supplement regulation 
and allow the FDA to require that dietary supplements be pre-approved 
for sale solely based on a clearly defined safety analysis. Then, if the 
manufacturer cannot prove under the courts' reasonableness standard that 
the product is safe for use at levels advocated by the manufacturer or 
generally practiced by the general public, the product should not be 
allowed to enter the market, or should be removed from the market if it is 
already present. However, once the safety-approved product is placed on 
the market, the manufacturers should be able to place health claims on 
the products that have not been pre-approved by the FDA. After the label 
is in the market, if the FDA can conclusively prove in court that the 
health claims are not true under a "reasonableness" standard, the court 
should enjoin the manufacturer from using the label. If, however, the 
product is safe and the FDA merely does not feel comfortable with the 
health claim because it has not been affirmed by scientific consensus, 
First Amendment principles dictate that the manufacturer should be 
allowed to attach the claim, albeit with a disclaimer stating that the FDA 
does not support the claim. By allowing the FDA to pre-approve the 
supplement based on safety requirements and yet prohibiting the agency 
from imposing prior restraints on health claims, Congress would be 
permitting the agency to further its purpose of protecting health and 
safety while respecting the First Amendment rights of the manufacturer 
and the consumer. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The debate over the FDA NLEA regulation of health claims on 
dietary supplements at issue in Pearson concerns basic principles of 
American government. The questions involved in this inquiry pierce to 
the center of free speech jurisprudence and the value of the free flow of 
information in the individual's search for the best health solutions. 
Pearson focuses the debate on whether the individual or the agency 
should determine what is in the public's best interest. While the medical 
industry and the government have a valid interest in keeping false and 
misleading health claims out of the public discourse and the marketplace, 
the FDA and Congress should not interfere with patronistic motives to 
impose prior restraints on labeling and to sift health information to 
protect the consumer's best interest. If a health claim lies in the gray area 
of science where connections between health and particular nutrients are 
unclear, legislation and regulation should favor the policy that the 
healthcare consumer should be provided with more rather than less 
information whenever possible, based on the theory that the individual is 
the appropriate determiner of his or her own best interest. This theory is 
consistent with the model of communication in traditional medicine, 
fully inform the patient of all possible benefits, risks and uncertainties 
and then leave the final choice to him whenever possible. If Congress 
grants the FDA the authority to require the safety of dietary supplements 
before they enter the market, the possibility that some false health claims 
will enter the marketplace may be threatening to the consumer's 
pocketbook but not to her health. 
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